The featured article of today’s blog is titled “Feds Can’t Force You To Unlock Your iPhone With Finger Or Face, Judge Rules” by Thomas Brewster I chose this article because I have mixed feelings over whether authorities have a right to access individuals’ devices during criminal investigations.
The title of this article pretty much explains its premise. In 2019, a Californian judge “ruled that American cops can’t force people to unlock a mobile phone with their face or finger” (Brewster, 2019, p. 1). In the past, biometric access to devices were not given the same testimonial protection under the fifth amendment that passcodes were. This is a little odd considering that these are all just different ways to get into your phone.
The main concern addressed in this article is law and technology. As Brewster (2019) addresses, personal devices can reveal much more that physical investigations, and we are still attempting to modify and create laws to address legal issues in the digital age (p. 1-2).
Should police and investigators be able to force individuals to provide access to their personal devices? To be honest, I am not 100% sure. On one hand, individuals cannot be forced to give over incriminating evidence and a mobile phone is pretty incriminating. Also, keep in mind that the individual would be practically handing over all their personal data on that device. On the other hand, personal devices could provide important evidence for criminal investigations. This is a bit of a dilemma because as a society, we have to draw a line between the governments access to power and holding individuals and entities accountable for their actions.
I am a bit conflicted on my stance for this issue. I find the idea of anyone (much less the government) accessing my phone or computer revolting. However, I would also want any means necessary to be available for law officials to convict criminals (especially criminals of heinous crimes). I would argue that for the most part, law enforcement should not force individuals to provide access to their device. However, I do think there are some instances where it is necessary.
In his article “Apple Ready to Make Its Case to Congress,” Brendan Sasso (2016) summarizes a 2016 case concerning whether it was legal for the FBI to coerce Apple into providing the government access to their customers’ encrypted data. Apple, as Sasso (2016) notes, believes that providing the government with their customers’ data to law officials weakens the devices security and “set a dangerous precedent for government intrusion on the privacy and safety of its citizens” (par. 4). Apple argues that providing the government access to personal devices “would create a back door” with no guarantee of limited governmental access (Curran, 2016, par. 6). Abuse of access does seem likely when referring to past investigations involving this issue. For example, Brewster (2016) provides a brief overview of an investigation where federal agents were authorized to demand the passcodes and “fingerprints and thumbprints of every person located at the subject premises” (par. 2-3). The agents, however, did not go through the proper steps before obtaining a warrant. Legal experts, as Brewster (2016) notes, claimed that these agents wanted “the ability to get a warrant on the assumption that they will learn more after they have a warrant” (par. 4).
Most arguments supporting government access to personal devices claim that these devices are essential to government investigations. The FBI, as Curran (2016) claims, believes that “their inability to access decrypted communications is hindering their efforts to pursue criminals and terrorists” (par. 3). The Department of Justice, Tom Leithauser (2016) argues that obtaining information from companies like Apple is routine and the digital equivalent of searching a person’s locker or desk (par. 2-5). Wireless News (2015) claims that law enforcement is losing access to evidence due to security measure taken by companies like Apple and Google (par. 6). One detective in Louisiana argued that heightened encryption measure interfered in a murder investigation of a pregnant woman (Wireless News, 2015, par. 7).
There are good arguments for both sides of this issue. As I mentioned before, I am unsure about which side is in the right, but I am not sure if there is a right or wrong side for this issue. I am by no means a law expert, but I do believe there are some instances where investigators should be able to get access to data, especially where heinous crimes are concerned. At the same time, I do not believe that the government should be given so much access to individuals’ devices that they violate citizens’ rights on the basis of “national safety.” For example, FBI agents in Curran’s (2016) article argued that their lack of access limited their ability to “pursue criminals and terrorist” (par. 3). Such a statement makes me a bit more skeptical of the motives to obtain data from personal devices due to the use of a buzzword (terrorist). The U.S. government has a bit of a shady past of investigating citizens and violating individual rights under the guise of ensuring national safety. Overall, I do not believe that the government and law enforcement generally has a right to demand access to personal devices, but I do believe there are some cases where access may be necessary.
References
Brewster, T. (2019, January, 14). Feds Can’t Force You To Unlock Your iPhone With Finger Or Face, Judge Rules. Forbes. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/01/14/feds-cant-force-you-to-unlock-your-iphone-with-finger-or-face-judge-rules/#7527e18542b7
Brewster, T. (2016, October, 16). Feds Walk Into A Building, Demand Everyone’s Fingerprints To Open Phones. Forbes. Retrieved from from https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/10/16/doj-demands-mass-fingerprint-seizure-to-open-iphones/#5f3354141288
Curran, J. (2016, February 22). Apple CEO rebuffs FBI request for encryption ‘back door’. Cybersecurity Policy Report. Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A445018547/ITOF?u=tel_a_utl&sid=ITOF&xid=aca66f37
Leithauser, T. (2016, March 14). DoJ’s request in San Bernardino case not unusual, AG lynch tells Senators. Cybersecurity Policy Report. Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A449315715/ITOF?u=tel_a_utl&sid=ITOF&xid=957e29db
Sasso, B. (2016, February 29). Apple Ready to Make Its Case to Congress. National Journal Daily. Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A541918890/AONE?u=tel_a_utl&sid=AONE&xid=cf2546d2
Scripps News/Toronto Star Investigation Reveals How Encryption Technology Hampers Law Enforcement. (2015, November 11). Wireless News. Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A434207201/ITOF?u=tel_a_utl&sid=ITOF&xid=dfb23c88
Social Informatics 